ADS
This book by Maged Mandour details in great detail how Egypt’s judicial, political, and economic institutions have become militarized since 2013.
In his book Egypt Under el-Sisi: A Nation on the Edge, Maged Mandour chronicles the militarization of the Egyptian state under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The book delves into the economic, legal, and political structural changes that have been implemented since Sisi’s ascension to power after the 2013 coup.
In his analysis of the military dictatorship, Mandour makes two primary claims.
The first challenges the conventional wisdom among academics, who think that the 2011 revolt sparked a revolutionary context but produced no really revolutionary results. Even if it wasn’t what everyone had hoped for, Mandour maintains that the revolt did bring about a revolutionary change. It broke with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s military legacy and led to an unparalleled increase in the militarization of the state.
The second line of reasoning maintains that economic forces, not political ones, make Sisi’s rule susceptible to overthrow, even if it has been solidified.
Mandour classifies Sisi’s leadership as a direct military government, in contrast to the dual/indirect systems of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, based on Samuel E. Finer’s (2002) definition of military regimes. The unique features of the military rule under Sisi are examined in the first four chapters.
The ideological discourse of hegemony is the focal point of Chapter 1, which follows the political history of the state and the standing of the military up to the 2013 Rabaa massacre.
The militarization of different departments of government is covered in Chapter 2, while the use of violence for public repression is addressed in Chapter 3. In chapter four, we look at how aggressive military capitalism rose to prominence and how the economic realm became militarized.
In every chapter, Mandour emphasizes how, since 1952, the military control over the public and commercial domains has been tightened by Sisi’s government in comparison to its predecessors. The last chapter delves into his speculations on the existing regime’s destiny and the chance of a democratic transition.
Thoughts on
Applying Finer’s categorization across the chapters is the book’s primary theoretical contribution.
Readers interested in current Egyptian politics will revel in Mandour’s analysis of the ideological roots of the Sisi government and the economic and legal instruments of militarization. But the book’s theoretical examination is its weak spot.
While the author makes a compelling case for how Sisi’s government meets Finer’s definition of direct military authority, his second theoretical pillar—the idea of passive revolution put forward by Antonio Gramsci—is underdeveloped and confused.
Some aspects of Gramsci’s notion, including the idea of a non-hegemonic society and the dependence on a non-ruling elite to rule, do not align with the present Egyptian system, as Mandour admits. This leads one to question the usefulness of Gramsci’s concept in this context.
Although Mandour acknowledges this caveat, he still comes to the conclusion that the coup ushered in extreme changes orchestrated by the elites without the involvement of the general populace. This conclusion could be better borne out by the literature on authoritarianism and military rule in the Middle East, as opposed to the idea of a passive revolution.
On occasion, the book alludes to other seminal academic works, such Gramsci’s state definition and Timothy Mitchell’s Rule of Experts on capitalism. Having said that, these discoveries are narrow and have been mostly ignored. Given the book’s journalistic tone and intended audience of non-specialists, the omission of lengthy theoretical debates may be acceptable.
Chapter three, “Three Possible Scenarios for Sisi’s Regime,” contains the book’s most thought-provoking introspective portion. Going beyond a simple recounting of official actions, this part delves into analytical contemplations on Egypt’s chances of undergoing a democratic transition.
At this point, Mandour’s claim about the regime’s weakness as a result of military capitalism (a term that aptly describes the military’s neoliberal economic domination) becomes relevant.
Four crucial questions are addressed in this chapter. To what extent will the regime shift? Will it fall like a domino effect, leading to widespread carnage as in Libya? Do you think it will deteriorate over time to the point where it collapses under the weight of public pressure? On the other hand, it could undergo internal reforms, eventually settling into a system of mixed military and civilian control that is more stable in the long run.
According to Mandour, the political and economic conditions that have been created by Sisi’s deep militarization of the state make elite-led reform very improbable. Given the lack of organized opposition and the military establishment’s strong desire to keep things the way they are, this government has the potential to remain in power even after Sisi steps down.
So far as Mandour is concerned, there are only two possible outcomes for the change: either an external shock, like a regional war, or internal deterioration, maybe caused by outside forces like the 2011 rebellion.
Two possible outcomes
Even if it’s persuasive, Mandour leaves out several important points in his analysis.
Both scenarios include an external danger to the system that forces top-down change; nevertheless, they are not identical. His research fails to take into account the influence of post-Arab Spring regional security agreements in either case.
He doesn’t go far enough in his analysis of the global monitoring and repression instruments that arose in Arab nations after 2011 to prop up dictatorship and quell political Islam. The approach fails to address the fact that protests are becoming less effective in bringing about change in the Arab world, which makes the prospect of another revolt seem remote.
A revival of Islamists as a possible organized political force and elite factionalism, which may occur even in the most restrictive regimes, are also overlooked in the obstacles to change led by the elite. The Muslim Brotherhood is just one of several Salafi organizations that might stage an Islamist revival. To provide a counterbalancing force, even a cosmetic resurgence of Islamists might be enough.
Military officers eager to put on a civilian front and neutralize competing military figures by allowing a decorative return of Islamists could be able to lead reform efforts. Regrettably, the larger literature on authoritarianism and civil-military interactions does not adequately elaborate on this section of the book, so it stands alone.
Another flaw is the way the book is structured. Although it makes use of a wealth of primary and media sources, the author doesn’t explain how he analyzed the data or how he decided which sources to include or exclude in the introduction. The academic rigor of the work is greatly diminished by this omission.
Regardless, Mandour’s book paints a thorough picture of Sisi’s military rule and lays the groundwork for theoretical investigations into democratic transitions and reform opportunities in Egypt in the future.
For academics interested in the Middle East who are looking for detailed examples of military-civil ties, this book is an essential read.
The opinions stated in this piece are those of the writers and do not represent Middle East Eye in any way.
