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A lady was condemned to death by stoning in Iran for adultery in 2010, but the execution was halted due to worldwide protest. Usually, the Islamic Republic of Iran is able to weather such criticism; but, this time was different. Not only did the US and EU voice their disapproval of Iran, but Brazil did as well—which may have surprised Iran’s decision-makers. Former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was friendly with President Lula Da Silva; Ahmadinejad was the first head of state from Iran to visit Brazil, where Da Silva was hosting a state visit.
Da Silva’s influence was crucial in getting Iran to remove the sentence, as Ahmadinejad made a strong effort to win over Latin American nations by building embassies, growing commerce, and strengthening connections. What gave Iran such a boost from Brazil’s condemnation while the US took a back seat? In her recent book, The Geopolitics of Shaming: When Human Rights Pressure Works – and When It Backfires, Rochelle Terman argues that the Islamic Republic faced larger relational costs as a result of Brazil’s meddling, due to their existing strategic cooperation.
Human rights shaming is the subject of Terman’s book, which seeks to investigate its mechanics, motivations, and effects. To provide a more critical perspective on the study of human rights and state behaviors, the political scientist from the University of Chicago intends to analyze the empirical evidence and provide ideas on the reasons why shaming might be effective at times and counterproductive at others. Since her method is relational, it follows that we must see states as self-interested entities that seek to advance and safeguard their own interests in order to make sense of their behavior. To do this, states form connections with one another; the effect of shame on these ties is conditional on their type.
Examining the record, Terman observes, ‘Shaming by a strategic partner is more successful for two reasons…To begin with, there is an increase in the direct relational costs when nations humiliate their partners…Secondly, it is more believable when friends and allies shame you, which means it damages your reputation more. Nevertheless, nations often refrain from or severely limit their criticism when it comes to a key partner’s human rights violations because of the significant cost of doing so.
Rochelle Terman
The Canadian government examined delicate topics including freedom of expression, capital punishment, and minority rights in its 2014 assessment of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Among the most stringent proposals made by the evaluation of the Iranian government were suggestions to amend certain laws and sanctions for those implicated in abuses. When discussing Saudi Arabia, however, the study aimed to avoid directly accusing the Saudi leadership by using more nebulous and imprecise terminology.
Terman notes that shame is more prevalent from enemies than friends, and it does very little to ensure adherence to the relevant human rights standard. It is true that local support for a leader or government may increase in response to hostile assaults, which provide the impression of strength and resistance. Several pieces of evidence point to the possibility that certain breaches of human rights norms were carried out with the intention of drawing international censure. Terman uses the 2013 “anti-gay propaganda” legislation passed by Vladimir Putin as an example; the law attempted to ban the portrayal of LGBT groups as an integral part of Russian society to children.
As condemnation poured in from the West, Vladimir Putin’s popularity ratings in Russia skyrocketed as he positioned himself as the protector of traditional values. Perhaps one of the main reasons Russia passed the bill was to boost its reputation at home by igniting a global uproar. A state may participate in shame for two main reasons: first, to preserve specific moral principles (a metaethical commitment), and second, to delegitimize an opponent (degradation, destablisation, or delegitimization). On sometimes, the two drives complement one another, while on other occasions, they clash.
When the target state becomes less inclined to comply with the standard due to criticism from an enemy, the conflict between the two perspectives emerges. There seem to be two main categories for those who would want to see a standard enforced: those who believe it is ethically correct and those who believe it would improve the interests and security of their state. While it’s certainly the right thing to do to prevent the spread of chemical weapons, states also have an interest in doing all they can to lessen the likelihood of a catastrophic incident.
“International shaming has the counterproductive effect on public attitudes of heightening nationalist sentiments and hostility toward advocacy efforts,” according to Terman’s research. What makes these defensive reflexes so important is that they cannot be boiled down to personal opinions about particular human rights concerns or the nature of applicable rules. Even among those who are generally sympathetic to human rights concerns, international humiliation may provoke defensive responses. When considering the usefulness and impact of human rights shaming, readers are presented with a wealth of material in The Geopolitics of Shaming. We should examine the available facts to determine the best effective technique for achieving conformity with human rights standards, rather than giving up on human rights advocacy altogether. Anyone working in politics or activism would do well to read this book since it provides a firm foundation from which to examine shame and consider its effects.
